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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 940610-CA 
RANDALL PUGMIRE, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-503 (Supp. 1994) . This Court has jurisdiction over 
the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Is the statutory definition of "dangerous weapon" 
contained in Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501 (2) (c) (Supp. 1994) 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of this case? 
A reviewing court examines "the trial court's decision on the 
constitutionality of [a] statute for correctness, according no 
deference to its legal conclusions." State v. Pharris. 846 P.2d 
454, 465 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993) 
(citations omitted). 
2. Did the trial court properly determine that a Buck knife 
is a "dangerous weapon" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-503, which prohibits possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person? 
The trial court's determination of whether a particular 
instrument constitutes a "dangerous weapon" presents a legal 
question. Nonetheless, in reviewing that question, the appellate 
court should grant the trial court a considerable "measure of 
discretion" because the trial court, which saw, felt, and examined 
the knife, was in a better position to make the determination. 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939-40 (Utah 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501 (2) (c) (Supp. 1994), defining 
certain terms related to weapons, provides: 
"Dangerous weapon" means any item that in 
the manner of its use or intended use is 
capable of causing death or serious bodily 
injury. The following factors shall be used 
in determining whether an item, object, or 
thing not commonly known as a dangerous weapon 
is a dangerous weapon: 
(i) the character of the instrument, 
object, or thing; 
(ii) the character of the wound produced, 
if any; and 
(iii) the manner in which the instrument, 
object, or thing was used. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2) (Supp. 1994), defining a 
category of persons not permitted to have dangerous weapons, 
provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Any person who is on parole or probation 
for a felony may not have in his possession or 
under his custody or control any dangerous 
weapon as defined in this part. 
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is 
guilty of a third degree felony. . . . 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with one count each of 
driving under the influence, open container, driving on suspension, 
and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person (R. 1-
2). Defendant was bound over on all but the charge of driving on 
suspension (R. 15-16). After a bench trial, the court dismissed 
the DUI charge and convicted defendant on the weapons charge, a 
third degree felony, and the open container violation, a class C 
misdemeanor (R. 39-42, 45-48) . Defendant was sentenced to 90 days 
in jail on the misdemeanor and zero to five years in prison on the 
weapons charge, to run concurrently. Execution of the sentence was 
suspended in favor of three years on probation, 120 days in jail 
with work and therapy release, aftercare associated with a 
substance abuse program, and various fines and fees (R. 51-52) . 
Defendant subsequently filed an application for certificate of 
probable cause, which the trial court granted (R. 66). Defendant 
then filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 70). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Jerry Knight, who had recently moved in with defendant's ex-
wife, Rexine Esplin, awoke on February 8, 1994 to find that his car 
antenna had been broken and his tires had been slashed, both for 
the second time (Tr. I).1 That evening, Knight went to Rexine's 
home, where she was experiencing a series of harassing telephone 
calls. Rexine had previously notified the police about such phone 
calls and also had a protective order entered against defendant (R. 
i "Tr." refers to the trial transcript of May 23, 1994. 
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14, 39). "Tense and nervous," Knight left the residence, driving 
toward a nearby 7-11 store (Tr. 8) . Within blocks, Knight saw 
defendant sitting in his vehicle with the engine running. Knight 
called Rexine on a car phone to tell her of defendant's whereabouts 
so that she could alert the police. According to Knight, when 
defendant got out of his vehicle and walked toward him, he 
staggered and appeared to be intoxicated (Tr. 8-9). 
Defendant then followed Knight in his car for a while. 
Subsequently, Knight somehow lost defendant and returned to 
Rexine's residence. Shortly thereafter, defendant showed up, and 
Knight let him in (Tr. 13). As soon as Rexine realized defendant 
was in the home, she headed for the telephone to call 911 (Tr. 14) . 
Walking quickly, defendant approached Rexine. Knight grabbed him 
from behind and wrestled him to the ground. The police arrived 
moments later, and defendant was arrested (Tr. 14-15, 60) . 
After the arrest, a police officer searched defendant and 
found a Buck knife with a four-inch blade in his pocket (Tr. 44). 
The officer who testified at trial stated that the knife was 
"definitely" larger than a normal pocket knife (Tr. 44). 
Towards the end of trial, after some discussion between both 
counsel and the court about the nature of the knife, the court 
stated: "I would like to see the knife. You have described it and 
why don't I see it? . . . That is more informative to me than 
having someone describe it" (Tr. 84). 
After the knife was produced, the trial court made the 
following written ruling: 
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The knife itself, in this court's view, is not 
what one would consider an ordinary pocket 
knife. The knife is very large and very heavy 
to be carried in one's pocket. It is a knife 
that would ordinarily be carried in a 
scabbard. The knife is a "buck" knife 110. 
It consists of a large and mostly metal handle 
being four and seven-eighths inches in length 
and ranges in width from one and one-eighth 
inches on one end of the handle to seven-
eighths inches on the blade end of the handle. 
The actual blade of the knife is a large 
heavy-duty blade which is seven-eighths inches 
wide at its widest point tapering to a point 
on the end of the blade. The blade is well 
sharpened and the total length of the blade is 
four and one-half inches and the blade 
extending from the knife when opened is three 
and three-quarters inches to four inches, 
depending on the measurement from the rounded 
handle to the tip of the blade. The court is 
of the opinion that this is the type of knife 
ordinarily used by game hunters for the 
purpose of cutting the throat, cleaning, 
skinning or dismembering game animals. The 
blade of the knife is in a locked position 
when fully opened. 
The court concludes that this knife is not an 
ordinary pocket knife, that the intended use 
of the knife is capable of causing death or 
serious bodily injury and is a dangerous 
weapon under the provisions of UCA 76-10-
501(2) (a) . 
(R. 39-40). The court then found defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt of possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person (R. 39). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The statutory definition of "dangerous weapon" is not 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of this case. In 
pertinent part, the definition states that "any item that in the 
manner of its . . . intended use is capable of causing death or 
serious bodily injury" is a dangerous weapon. Utah Code Ann. §76-
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10-501(2) (c) (Supp. 1994). The Court has previously construed 
"intended use" to include the item's objectively intended use. 
State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 929 (Utah App. 1991) . Plainly, 
a knife whose primary purpose is to skin animals, cut through 
flesh, and dismember game is capable of causing death or serious 
bodily injury and is, therefore, a dangerous weapon as a matter of 
law. Plainly, the statutory definition was sufficiently definite 
to put defendant on notice that his possession of a Buck knife was 
unlawful. 
Defendant also argues that the evidence was insufficient to 
support the trial court's determination that his Buck knife was a 
dangerous weapon. Defendant, however, has failed to marshal the 
evidence in support of the trial court's ruling. This Court, 
therefore, should not consider his claim. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TERM "DANGEROUS WEAPON," DEFINED 
IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-501 (2) (c) , 
IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS 
APPLIED TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 
BECAUSE IT PLAINLY EMBODIES ITEMS 
THAT ARE OBJECTIVELY INTENDED TO BE 
CAPABLE OF CAUSING DEATH OR SERIOUS 
BODILY INJURY 
Defendant asserts that the statutory definition of "dangerous 
weapon" is unconstitutionally vague because it provides 
insufficient guidance for determining what does and does not fall 
within the ambit of the law. Because legislative enactments are 
endowed with a strong presumption of constitutionality, the burden 
is on the party challenging the validity of the statute to 
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establish its invalidity. State ex rel. Division of Consumer 
Protection v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990) . 
A reviewing court will not declare statutes unconstitutional 
"unless there is no reasonable basis upon which they can be 
construed as conforming to constitutional requirements." In re 
Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988). 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine on which defendant relies 
requires that a penal statute define a criminal offense with 
"sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what 
conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 
U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (citations omitted). Impossible standards of 
clarity are not required. As the Utah Supreme Court has noted, in 
rejecting a vagueness challenge to a statute that prohibited 
driving at a "speed greater than is reasonable and prudent" under 
existing conditions, "[t]he statute need only be as definite and 
certain as the subject matter permits." State v. Pilcher. 636 P.2d 
470, 471 (Utah 1981). 
As applied to his case, defendant believes that three factors 
-- "the relatively small size of the knife in question, the 
numerous legitimate uses of such a knife, and the lack of any prior 
warning to the Defendant" -- preclude characterization of his knife 
as a dangerous weapon and demonstrate the constitutional infirmity 
of the statutory definition. See Br. of App. at 17. For his 
argument, defendant relies primarily -- and mistakenly --on State 
v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991). 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501(2) (c) defines the term as follows: 
"Dangerous weapon" means any item that in 
the manner of its use or intended use is 
capable of causing death or serious bodily 
injury. The following factors shall be used 
in determining whether an item, object, or 
thing not commonly known as a dangerous weapon 
is a dangerous weapon: 
(i) the character of the instrument, 
object, or thing; 
(ii) the character of the wound produced, 
if any; and 
(iii) the manner in which the instrument, 
object, or thing was used. 
In Archambeau, this Court rejected a similar vagueness 
challenge to the term "dangerous weapon."2 In so doing, it 
interpreted "dangerous weapon" to include two separate categories 
of instruments: "(1) items commonly known as dangerous weapons; and 
(2) items not commonly known as dangerous weapons but included if, 
in considering the three enunciated [statutory] characteristics, 
they qualify." State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 929 (Utah App. 
1991). In holding that two 10-inch knives with five- to six-inch 
blades and a 48-inch blow gun were commonly known as dangerous 
weapons, the Court set out the test that proves dispositive to this 
case: "[0]ur decision must rest on whether defendant should have 
been reasonably aware that his hunting knives and blowgun were 
objectively dangerous weapons." Id. That is, if the nature of the 
item is such that it is capable of causing death or serious bodily 
injury, then that item is a dangerous weapon within the meaning of 
the statute. Id. 
2
 Contrary to defendant's assertion, Archambeau did not 
consider a facial challenge to the statute. See State v. 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 928. 
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The question this Court must answer, then, is whether 
defendant here should have been reasonably aware that his Buck 
knife was an objectively dangerous weapon. The trial court 
specifically found that defendant's knife was of the type 
"ordinarily used for the purpose of cutting the throat, cleaning, 
skinning or dismembering game animals" (R. 39) . The objectively 
intended purpose of the instrument, then, is to cut flesh, muscle, 
and bone. 
Applying the statutory definition of dangerous weapon, as 
construed by the Archambeau court to include the objectively 
intended use of the item, the statute plainly warned defendant 
that, as a probationer, he could not possess a heavy hunting knife 
with a 4^ inch blade. Because the objectively intended use of such 
a knife is to cut, clean, skin, and dismember game animals, the 
knife is, as a matter of law, capable of causing death or serious 
bodily injury and is, therefore, a dangerous weapon. 
That the knife had lawful, utilitarian purposes related to 
hunting and camping and that defendant may have subjectively 
intended to use it for such purposes, as he asserts, is irrelevant 
to the determination of whether the knife was an objectively 
dangerous weapon within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
501(2) (c). Indeed, the very usages that defendant cites --
cleaning game, butchering meat, constructing tent pegs, and cutting 
rope -- all support the conclusion that the knife was a dangerous 
weapon, by inference clearly capable of causing death or serious 
bodily injury. See Br. of Appellant at 18-19. 
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Similarly, defendant's reliance on the size of the knife 
("relatively small") is misplaced. In State v. Rovball, the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized that a Buck knife with a four- to six-inch 
blade was a deadly weapon within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-501(b) (1978) (defining aggravated assault as assault carried 
out with a deadly weapon) . State v. Rovball, 710 P.2d 168, 168-69 
(Utah 1985) . If such a knife is "deadly" within the meaning of the 
aggravated assault statute, it is a fortiori "dangerous" within the 
meaning of the statute governing possession by a restricted person. 
As applied to the facts of defendant's case, the definition of 
"dangerous weapon" promulgated by the legislature is as clear as 
possible given the variety of items that, in the manner of their 
objective use, can cause death or serious bodily injury. See State 
v. Pilcher, 636 P.2d at 471. Of course, the legislature could have 
tried to enact a precise laundry list of all items that in the 
manner of their objectively intended use are capable of causing 
death or serious bodily injury. Even a thorough enumeration, 
however, would prudently end with a catch-all provision, e.g., "or 
any other item that in the manner of its use or intended use is 
capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." As written, 
however, the statute provides a sufficiently definite legal 
standard by which defendant and law enforcement officers could 
reasonably understand that defendant was prohibited from possessing 
the Buck knife at issue. 
Finally, defendant reads Archambeau to require that he be 
given specific, personal notice of the prohibition against 
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possessing dangerous weapons. This is not a proper reading of the 
case. This Court cited to the actual notice defendant received 
only to support the conclusion it had already reached that 
Archambeau "should have been reasonably aware" of the objective 
dangerousness of the weapons. State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 
929. Furthermore, everyone is on constructive notice of the laws 
of the land. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304 (1990) ; Worrall v. 
Oaden City Fire Dept. , 616 P.2d 598, 603-04 (Utah 1980) (Hall, J., 
dissenting). 
"Dangerous weapon," for purposes of the statute at issue, 
clearly includes at its core those items that reasonable persons 
would not disagree are capable of inflicting death or serious 
bodily injury in the manner of their objectively intended use. See 
State v. Davis, 711 P.2d 232, 234 (Utah 1985) ("There can be no 
question that defendant's [unloaded] handgun is a dangerous 
weapon."); see also State v. Clevidence, 736 P.2d 379 (Ariz. App. 
1987) (6" double-bladed hunting knife is deadly weapon, statutorily 
defined as "anything designed for lethal use," as a matter of law) . 
Defendant's Buck knife is such an item. 
Because the statute provides a sufficiently definite standard 
against which defendant could determine that his possession of the 
Buck knife was unlawful, his argument that the statute is 
unconstitutionally vague as applied must fail. 
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POINT TWO 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO 
MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE 
COURT 'S JUDGMENT, THIS COURT NEED 
NOT REACH HIS SUFFICIENCY OF THE 
EVIDENCE CLAIM 
In order to mount an insufficiency challenge to a guilty 
verdict, an appellant must marshal all the evidence in support of 
the trial court's verdict and then demonstrate that "the evidence, 
including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is 
insufficient to support the findings against an attack." State v. 
Moosman. 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990) . If a defendant fails to 
properly marshal the evidence, the reviewing court may properly 
decline to consider the sufficiency of the evidence claim. State 
v. Chavez. 840 P.2d 846, 848 (Utah App. 1992) cert, denied, 857 
P.2d 948 (Utah 1993); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1207 (Utah 
App. 1991); State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-89 (Utah App. 1990). 
In this case, because defendant has wholly failed to marshal the 
evidence supporting the trial court's verdict, this Court should 
not consider his claim. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction for possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted 
person. 
12 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
The State does not request oral argument in this case. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /O^day of February, 1995, 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
%m^L C jMkJc 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing brief of Appellee were mailed first class, postage 
prepaid, to Michael J. Petro, Attorney for Defendant, Young and 
Kester, 101 East 200 South, Springville, Utah 84663, this 10 day 
of February, 1995. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Tr ia l Cour t ' s Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Verdict 
t'-*Z7 I 53 hi VI 
JN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ^ 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
vs. 
RANDALL PUGMIRE 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
and VERDICT 
CASE NO. 941400119 
DATE May 27, 1994 
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
CLERK: LHH 
This matter came before the Court for trial on May 23, 1994. Deputy Utah County 
Attorney Sherry Ragan appeared for and on behalf of the State of Utah. The defendant was 
present and represented by Mike Petro, Esq. 
The defendant, in open court, waived his right to a jury trial and requested a bench 
trial. The plaintiff did not object. 
The court accepted a stipulation of the parties regarding the testimony of witness Ron 
Carlson, who was then excused. 
The following witnesses were called by the plaintiff and sworn and testified, to-wit: 
Jerry Knight, Rexine Esplin and Officer Weinmuller. The court received exhibit 1. The 
plaintiff rested after which, the defendant moved the court to dismiss count 1: Driving Under 
the Influence of Alcohol/Drugs. The plaintiff responded to the motion. The court granted 
the motion and dismissed count 1: Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol/Drugs, a Third 
Degree Felony. Mr. Petro was directed to prepare findings and conclusions consistent with 
the court's granting of the motion to dismiss. 
Regarding count 2: Open Container in a Motor Vehicle, a Class A Misdemeanor the 
defendant admitted his guilt, and the court made a finding that the defendant was guilty of 
Open Container in a Motor Vehicle, a Class A Misdemeanor. 
Regarding count 4 of the Information: Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a 
Restricted Person, a Third Degree Felony, the defendant advised the court that he would not 
put on any testimony and admitted to the court that on or about February 8, 1994, in Utah 
County, Utah, the defendant was on probation for a felony and had in his possession at that 
time a knife. The defendant handed to the court a prepared Trial Memorandum Argument 
and asked that the court receive the Trial Memorandum Argument with regard to count 4 of 
the Information. The plaintiff requested a short time in which to respond and the court 
received the Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count IV of the 
Information on May 26, 1994. The court being fully advised in the premises now makes the 
following findings, conclusions and renders a verdict: 
1. UCA 76-10-503 (2) (a) provides as follows: "Any person who is on parole for a felony 
or is incarcerated at the Utah State Prison or other like facility may not have in his 
possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in this part. 
UCA 76-10-501 (2) (a) "'Dangerous Weapon' means any item that in the manner of its 
use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. In construing 
2 
whether an item, object, or thing not commonly known as a dangerous weapon is a 
dangerous weapon, the character of the instrument, object, or thing; the character of the 
wound produced, if any; and the manner in which the instrument, object, or thing was used 
are determinative." 
2. The appellate courts of this state have not directly ruled on what constitutes a pocket 
knife, nor what dimensions a knife must be in order to constitute a dangerous weapon. 
Counsel for the defendant has furnished the court with citations to cases in California, 
Hawaii, Oregon and Nevada which have considered what constitutes an ordinary pocket knife 
and what type of a knife would be considered a dangerous weapon or a dagger or a dirk for 
purposes of the particular state's statute. The cases cited by defense counsel are somewhat 
enlightening but not particularly helpful with regard to the Utah statute. 
3. A personal examination of the knife found on the defendant at the time of his arrest has 
been made by the court. The parties agreed that the court could view the knife and the court 
has taken the liberty of marking the knife as exhibit #6. The knife itself, in this court's 
view, is not what one would consider an ordinary pocket knife. The knife is very large and 
very heavy to be carried in one's pocket. It is a knife that would ordinarily be carried in a 
scabbard. The knife is a "buck" knife 110. It consists of a large and mostly metal handle 
being four and seven-eighths inches in length and ranges in width from one and one-eighth 
inches on one end of the handle to seven-eighths inches on the blade end of the handle. The 
actual blade of the knife is a large heavy-duty blade which is seven-eighths inches wide at its 
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widest point tapering to a point on the end of the blade. The blade is well sharpened and the 
total length of the blade is four and one-half inches and the blade extending from the knife 
when opened is three and three-quarters inches to four inches, depending on the measurement 
from the rounded handle to the tip of the blade. This court is of the opinion that this is the 
type of knife ordinarily used by game hunters for the purpose of cutting the throat, cleaning, 
skinning or dismembering game animals. The blade of the knife is in a locked position when 
fully opened. 
4. The court concludes that this knife is not an ordinary pocket knife, that the intended use 
of the knife is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury and is a dangerous weapon 
under the provisions of UCA 76-10-501 (2) (a). 
5. The court finds the defendant guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of count 4 of the 
Information: Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a Third Degree 
Felony. 
Dated at Provo, Utah this 27th day of May, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
BOYD L. PARK, J U D G E / v / ^ ; ; j ^ 
•• $'*$& 
cc: Utah County Attorney 
Mike Petro, Esq. 
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